Israel: threat to invade Palestinian territories is real
military analysis by SGM Kevin
Amid the violence of the Palestinian intifida, the Israeli government has
said it will restrain itself. But in reality, it is poised for a major military
strike that would seize portions of the territories and destroy the Palestinian
leadership. Israel is exhausting its last options before going to war.
In recent weeks, efforts to revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
have resumed. The Bush administration has begun to back the notion of deploying
international monitors to the West Bank and Gaza. And Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon said last week that he will stick to the US-brokered cease-fire.
But signs indicate Israel has already begun a countdown to a major military
intervention in the Palestinian territories. Fourteen Palestinian leaders
have been assassinated in the past month; although Israel has not acknowledged
responsibility for all of them, it does have a policy of targeted assassinations,
and such actions are often the prelude to a conventional military operation.
Israeli forces are testing their avenues of ingress into Palestinian-controlled
areas and probably gathering tactical intelligence.
The larger diplomatic and political atmosphere indicates the Sharon government
is exhausting its last diplomatic options. It has announced the possible call-up
of reservists abroad in order to generate international attention. And the
Bush administration is scrambling to draw up plans to quickly deploy monitors
to head off conflict.
The Israeli government also appears increasingly convinced that it can mount
a messy, but ultimately successful, military operation. Arab militaries are
weak. Following the assassination campaign, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) will
likely seal off the territories and surge into so-called Areas A, now held
by Palestinian security forces. Subsequent operations would focus on cleaning
out leaders and arms caches while securing a foothold in the largest urban
areas. Such an operation would destroy the Oslo accords and in effect, though
not officially, redraw the Israeli borders.
The Logic of the Conflict
The chief targets of an Israeli operation would be five to six major areas
now under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA). These areas comprise
the so-called Areas A, the main urban Palestinian areas, that Israeli forces
have increasingly probed in recent weeks. These include Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah,
Bethlehem and Hebron in the West Bank as well as most of the Gaza Strip.
The Israeli government is probably emboldened by the fact that no Arab military
is in a position to come to the rescue of the Palestinians. The Egyptian military,
the region's largest, has serious problems with readiness, making it difficult
for the Egyptian army to even threaten Israel across the Sinai Peninsula.
The Syrian military is weak, too.
The IDF would first seek to seal off the territories, blocking refugees
and terrorists. Sealing off the Green Line, the legal international border,
would consume a significant number of troops backed by limited amounts of
armor. Conventional forces would move into the West Bank and Gaza to establish
perimeters so special operations forces could sweep for leaders, operatives
and weapons caches. Israeli security would have to blunt terrorist attacks.
In a new operation, Palestinian Security Services as well as militants would
quickly devolve to a cell structure in order to conduct operations without
being detected. As was the case in the last uprising from 1987 to 1993, Israel
would have a hard time achieving a clear-cut victory. Three million Palestinians
live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
More recent urban conflicts, such as Russia's battle for Grozny in Chechnya,
underscore the fact that tactics and terrain can hamper a modern, well-equipped
military. Urban terrain presents a number of dangers; the close proximity
of opposing forces results in more brutal, bloodier fighting. Streets channel
the movement of both troops and vehicles, leaving advancing forces open to
ambush and blunting the advantage of armor. Buildings provide ample opportunities
for sniper fire and limit line of sight.
Moreover, the Palestinians have reportedly established arms caches and supply
houses throughout Areas A, according to Israeli news reports and think tanks.
These warehouses hold ammunition, weapons, food, water and other supplies.
To dismantle the Palestinian Authority, Israel would need to destroy these
caches. Special operations forces are the likeliest candidates.
But the process would consume valuable time. Each passing day would give
the Palestinians opportunities to retrench or escape into neighboring Arab
countries. By sustaining a low-level conflict and trapping Israel into occupation,
the Palestinians gain an advantage since they can fight only a guerrilla-type
war. Israel's aversion to casualties would also weigh heavily on any operation.
Even if Israel achieves the complete destruction of the Palestinian Authority,
it would leave these areas lawless. To prevent anarchy, Israel would need
to guarantee security, precluding an exit strategy.
Other Security Considerations
Protecting Jewish settlers in the territories would also present a military
challenge. An estimated 200,000 settlers are dispersed throughout the West
Bank and Gaza territories today. The Israeli government has long used the
advancement of settlements as a line of defense.
Though these settlements are well-guarded, Israeli politics require the
defense forces to protect settlers. But the wide dispersal of settlements
would require help from the IDF. Illustrative of the problem, Defense Minister
Binyamin Ben Eliezer recently called for dismantling the farthest outlying
settlements so as to avoid straining the military, according to Israeli news
reports.
Where It Ends
The Sharon government has avoided making any direct threats about reoccupying
the territories. But continued Palestinian attacks against Israelis are undercutting
the Israeli government. Going to the peace table now, with terrorist attacks
underway, would be seen as rewarding terrorism. Sharon has personally warned
that he will not continue to tolerate terrorism.
And Sharon's philosophy predisposes him to seek a dramatic solution. When
he masterminded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, he sought to
break the back of the Palestinian guerrillas there. Sharon has hesitated to
send troops into the West Bank and Gaza because he knows the cost Israel paid
for the Lebanon campaign.
The Israeli threat is real. The quick deployment of international monitors
is likely the only alternative to conflict.
