Falklands
fever not likely to turn into war
by the
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
In a speech on February 7
highlighting steadily escalating Anglo-Argentine tensions, the
increasingly explosive issue of the Falkland Islands was the volatile
subject. Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
announced that her government was prepared to denounce London's
"latest re-militarization of the South Atlantic" before the
UN's General Assembly, the Security Council and the Committee on
Decolonization.
Reaching a boiling
point
The increased
"militarization" that President Kirchner was condemning
refers to Britain's recent deployment of its most modern and
formidable destroyer, the $1.5 billion HMS Dauntless, as well as to
the rumored deployment of a nuclear submarine, which has neither been
confirmed nor denied by British authorities. The Argentine government
also found it to be an act of aggression when the Duke of
Cambridge, Prince William, was dispatched on a six-week training tour
as search and rescue helicopter pilot in the archipelago.
Not surprisingly, in her
speech, President Cristina Kirchner failed to mention the
increasingly aggressive tactics that her own government (and that of
her husband before her) has pursued against Britain's claim to the
Falklands in these last two administrations. Last September,
President Kirchner formally raised the Falklands issue before the UN
General Assembly. At the time she threatened to suspend certain
bilateral agreements affecting Britain, such as biweekly air travel
to the archipelago from Chile, if Britain refused to enter into talks
about the Falkland Islands' future. Additionally, on December 5,
Argentina launched a series of maritime exercises to isolate the
Falklands, detaining various forms of fishing craft that it
interpreted as capable of "breaking the blockade" around
the islands. On January 11, Argentina started a "squid war"
against the archipelago, urging Argentine fishermen to catch the
squid before it reached the British beaches.
Since late January,
Argentina has been able to routinely secure a vote of confidence from
fellow members of ALBA and MERCOSUR, with these Latin American states
supporting its bid to claim sovereignty over the islands. Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez even went as far as to give support for
Argentina in the unlikely event of a military standoff. Though this
was largely a symbolic gesture, (ships flying the British flag would
still be allowed to enter these ports) it struck a considerable
symbolic blow to Anglo-Argentine relations. All of this culminated in
last week's speech, when President Kirchner pledged to a room full of
politicians and Falklands war veterans that she would take her case
against Britain to the United Nations. Throughout all of this, the
crux of London's stance --- that the islanders' desires should be
protected above all else --- has remained unaltered.
Domestic roots of the
tense Anglo-Argentine relationship
The tense foreign policy
stances of these two nations reflect escalating domestic troubles in
both countries. Ironically, the bellicose attitude of both
protagonists comes at a time when their military preparedness is
greatly diminished in real terms. The British Defense Ministry is
scheduled to be particularly hard hit this year by further budget
cuts (two percent cuts were announced in 2011). When Prime Minister
David Cameron organized a National Security Committee in January in
order to review the diplomatic strategy affecting the Falklands
region, the issue of securing the archipelago amidst cuts in military
appropriations, particularly regarding the Royal Navy, was of prime
concern.
Many critics of
Cristina's unalterable stance on the Falklands argue that her
position is really just a way to deflect attention from the country's
growing domestic woes. Speculation surrounding the nature of the
Falklands/Malvinas conflict has intensified in the intervening years
and has been full of subtle revelations suggesting that the conflict
has become a massive distraction meant to becloud the Argentine
public. It can be seen as an effort to keep foreign observers from
peering too closely into allegations of corruption, executive
ineptitude, and out-of-control inflation. While Argentina recently
showed one of the highest GDP growth rates in the entire region, it
has also faced criticism by the IMF for the quality of its INDEC
inflation figures (which are uncomfortably high). The fact that the
country's financial papers remain locked into a low investment grade
status is further cause for concern, according to critics. Due to
gross public spending, austerity measures are gradually being
enforced on a provincial level, making the prospect of rising social
tensions palpable.
Although she is widely
popular after initiating her presidency in slow gear, and flanked at
first by considerable carping, President Fernandez de Kirchner's warm
public reception is beginning to cool. Unemployment is rapidly
climbing; inflation could be as high as 25 percent, and the accuracy
of official statistics are being chronically challenged. The
government could be in for a long siege where a distraction like that
of the Falklands could prove increasingly welcomed. According to a
poll by Ibarometro, seventy percent of Argentines that were surveyed
consider the bid to reclaim the Falklands important, though only
thirty percent would want the country to go to war. Britain would
also be hard-pressed in winning over support for a war against
Argentina, especially after the country's protracted and costly
experience in Iraq.
Is it all about oil?
Of course, neither
Argentina nor Britain might not be so concerned about control of the
Falklands if there were not so many natural resources to be extracted
in the region, particularly that of oil. Though in the early nineties
there was talk of a bilateral oil mining co-dominion between Britain
and Argentina, with the ascension of the Kirchners to power, any
collaborative talk was muted. The British Geological Survey reported
that there are substantial off shore oil reserves that could procure
500,000 barrels per day. Three prominent oil-exploring firms have
been prospecting on the ocean floor surrounding the islands: Borders
and Southern Petroleum Plc, Rockhopper & Desire Petroleum. The
potential rewards of investment in offshore drilling have been
compared to the 2007 offshore Jubilee field discovery in Ghana, which
turned that country into one of the top fifty oil states in the
world. Morgan Stanley has ranked the Falklands region, which could
potentially contain 8.3 billion barrels of oil, as one of the top
fifteen offshore prospects of 2012, though later estimates have
tempered these high expectations. Despite the lucrative
possibilities, larger oil companies so far continue to tread a fine
line, making certain that they do not get involved in the political
dispute at hand, thus stalling any momentum forward as talks are
carried on behind the scenes.
The Rattenbach Report
A tantalizing side bar to
the 1982 legacy of the Argentine-UK altercation will be furnished
when the still confidential Rattenbach Report is entirely
declassified.
After its defeat in the
Falklands war and before turning over the authority to civilian rule,
Argentina's military government assigned Colonel Benjamin Rattenbach
with the task of preparing the aforementioned report, leading an
internal investigation team to examine the main mistakes and setbacks
that lead to Argentina's ultimate defeat.
The report describes the
major tactical mistakes that Argentina committed during the conflict.
According to an informal version of the report published by the
Argentine magazine "Siete Días," its findings mention that
"there was a lack of application of the joint training
doctrine." Instead of having an interest in a unified Air Force,
Argentina's Navy also retained control of a semi-private Air Force
Battalion which, as a result, impaired the effectiveness of their
attacks on the British Navy's unit. The report claimed, among other
things, that pilots had not been trained to fire against moving
targets in the ocean. In other words, the Argentine offensive
approach against the British was improvised. Although others praised
Argentina's military strikes, the report indicated that 60 percent of
the bombs dropped on the British ships failed to explode.
Besides pointing a
searchlight at all corners of some of the more controversial aspects
of the decisions being made by the Argentine military Junta, the
report also contains key information on the conflict regarding the
germane international framework at the time. Now with the
declassification of the report, Cristina Kirchner is likely to seek
evidence that will strengthen her arguments regarding the formal
claims filed before the UN against Britain.
Unfortunately, the ground
rules dictate that the full report will not be disclosed. A
commission was assigned to analyze the document in thirty days
(starting from February 7, 2012) and only parts that are of interest
to Argentina's security requirements will be formally published. This
is because the reports --- if useful --- could tabulate a skein of
acts of skullduggery on the part of the Argentine military junta of
the late 1970s.
Problematic US role in
1982 Argentine invasion: answers are needed
There are still a number
of issues regarding Washington DC's attitude towards the Argentine
attack against the Falklands in 1982 that need amplification and
clarification. The Reagan Administration may have played a
considerably larger and more sinister role in the detonation of the
Falklands war than previously acknowledged, and it may have provided
considerable comfort to the Argentine side. While there is no
question that President Regan nursed a distinct pro-British bias, the
same was not necessarily true of some of his servitors. The question
is how much the ambassador to the United Nations at the time, Jeanne
Kirkpatrick, knew about the impending military action. The same can
be asked of General Vernon Walters who was in Argentina as part of a
tour of Latin America to rebuild links with right-wing military
regimes in the region, to which Washington was distinctly partial.
Walter was visiting senior Argentine military officials in Buenos
Aires at the time that the Argentine attack against the Falklands was
being launched. The then commander of the Argentine Navy, Emilio
Massera, later told COHA director Larry Birns that Walters was
informed about the Argentine military's impending attack in a
gathering at a military club and merely shrugged his shoulders.
The assembled senior
military officers meeting in Buenos Aires interpreted the gesture by
Argentine officials in the room as one of consent by the United
States, for the attack and a similar conclusion was drawn by
Ambassador Kirkpatrick, who was at the Argentine embassy in
Washington for a dinner that very same evening. Circumstantial
evidence exists indirectly showing that the Argentines present that
evening could reasonably have concluded that their country's action
against the British came as no great surprise to the Pentagon. The
presence of General Walters at the dinner renders this information
nearly undeniable. This was particularly the case since General
Walters and Ambassador Kirkpatrick were among the most influential
and ranking figures in the administration as well as among the most
conservative and those most sympathetic to the military Junta.
Conclusion
Despite these highly
publicized developments, one reality remains clear: Britain and
Argentina are not going back to war and they both know it. Both
Britain's and Argentina's military has been substantially downsized
over the last few decades. What we may be seeing here are tactical
shifts reflecting the profound changes that have been seen in
Argentine foreign and economic policy since the 1990s. These tactics
are designed to isolate Britain in regional circles as well as in
public and international opinion, in an attempt weaken its resolve
when it comes to an emotional issue like the one involving the
Falklands. Debates within Britain have revealed some small cracks in
the nation's resolve, but they are unlikely to sway Prime Minister
Cameron and his Tory party to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward
Buenos Aires. British political circles are convinced that there are
diplomatic victories to be best harvested through skillful workings
of the issue, and little to lose.
This
analysis was prepared by the following members of the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs staff: director Larry Birns and research
associates Alex Gibson, Gustavo de Lima Palhares, and Faizaan Sami
