GOP voices
voces de Republicanos
Seatrade, Panama Registry expels 60 Iranian ships
TVN, Fallece trabajador de la ACP tras accidente en esclusas de Cocolí
Seatrade, Higher fuel prices could shift traffic back to US West Coast ports
gCaptain, Scientists update world magnetic model as North Pole shifts
EFE, Brillan estrellas en el Rod Carew
Global Banking & Finance, Liberty Latin America op center here
El Economista, Telefónica negocia venta de bienes en Panamá etc.
Basu, The sorry state of the world economy
Adler, A radical vision for a new Bretton Woods
Marketplace, Ever heard of modern monetary theory?
SCMP, Modern Monetary Theory is an illusion
The Intercept, Google hired gig economy workers for drone project
Reuters, Germany ready to buy company stakes to protect core industry
STRI, When does noise become a message?
Reuters, Siberian cave findings shed light on extinct human species
Mongabay, El oceano se ahoga
Reuters, Legacy of contamination at old US naval base
The Guardian, George Soros: China uses tech advances to repress its people
Mongabay, Maya revive native bees and ancient beekeeping
Gizmodo, New star map reveals warped Milky Way
EFE, La reforma de la Constitución sin futuro en Panamá a corto plazo
La Prensa, Martinelli seguirá preso
Newsroom Panama, Plea deal in Blue Apple bribery scam
La Estrella: José Gabriel Carrizo, la apuesta de ‘Nito’ para la vicepresidencia
TVN, Nilda Quijano como compañera de formula de Blandón
La Estrella, El FAD concluye su propuesta electoral
AFP, Trump reafirma que la opción militar en Venezuela está sobre la mesa
AFP, Salvadorans react to the election of Nayib Bukele
The Hill, Puerto Rico statehood supporters pin hopes on House action
Second Nexus, Merkley: “This is what evil looks like”
Greenwood-Nguyen & Roth, Ocean plastic isn’t the fault of the global south
Gessen, The Trump-Russia investigation and the Mafia state
Heide, Inside the mind of an opioid addict
Kiriakou: Torture, murder and misconduct under color of law
Sanders, Now is not the time for compromise on Medicare for All
Font: Venezuela, antesala hacia la guerra
Blades, Sobre Venezuela
Gandásegui, Venezuela continues to resist US aggression
Sagel, De vuelta a la realidad
Sagel, A un siglo de J. D. Salinger
AOC: Getting famous overnight, social media strategy and more
NACLA, Una entrevista con Simón Mejía de Bomba Estéreo
Reuters, “Boy Erased” erased from Brazilian cinemas
Crusells, Medio siglo del último concierto de los Beatles
So how does the relatively tiny Panama defend itself in world of great power rivalries and asymmetrical warfare by which great powers are frequently defeated?
We have the 1977 Permanent Neutrality Treaty that on its face allows the United States and other signatory parties to militarily intervene in order to keep the canal open. The way Washington has twisted it, the word “neutrality” means nothing, and the stricture against intervention in Panama’s internal affairs is likewise disregarded. It’s about Panama being a US protectorate of sorts.
The original sense of it, however, is that Panama stays neutral. It means that the canal is open for everyone without regard to global political alignments, so that nobody has a reason to attack it.
The Martinelli administration took a dangerous detour with its security alliance with Israel. That included photos of Israeli trainers flaunting anti-Arab stereotypes in the training of Panamanian presidential guards, and the use of Israeli surveillance technology against Panamanians and Americans. In a spectacularly stupid and ultimately unsuccessful legal action, Martinelli himself as much as admitted that a known or believed Israeli connection could attract attackers to the canal.
So, should Panama be seen to align itself with Israel against the Palestinians? Or with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in thier Sunni jihad against Yemen and the Shiite branch of Islam generally?
Or, if Latin America is to be split into left and right blocs as US neoconservatives would like, should Panama line up against Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Uruguay, Suriname and Venezuela?
Panama should avoid such alignments because they might give some country or organization a motive to attack the Panama Canal, or at least lower inhibitions against such a thing.
In a seven-way presidential race at a time of great public disillusionment and battered democratic institutions, perhaps vice presidential nominees will matter more than they usually do. Perhaps on the campaign trail some of the apparently dismal ones will rise and shine, and some of the apparently brilliant ones will fade and fall. But to the editor, this is how the VP picks – apart from all the other factors in making a choice – look at the outset, in this order. A vice president needs to be ready to step up to the presidency in an instant if fate calls and it’s that, not some identity that might grab some segment of the vote, that matters.
Ricardo Lombana – Guillermo Márquez Amado: SERIOUS
José Isabel Blandón – Nilda Quijano: SERIOUS
Saúl Méndez – Maribel Gordón: SERIOUS
Ana Matilde Gómez – Jorge Arango: THE USUAL
Marco Ameglio – Mario Boyd Galindo: THE USUAL
Rómulo Roux – Luis Casís: NOT SERIOUS
Nito Cortizo – José Gabriel Carrizo: NOT SERIOUS
Ann Landers
Once upon a time there was an environmental crime, labor law violation and pump and dump insider stock trading swindle known as Petaquilla Gold. Its locus of activity was in the mountains between northern Cocle province and the western part of Colon’s Costa Abajo, but it was registered in Canada as Petaquilla Minerals. At one relatively brief moment it spread to Spain, promising to reopen a gold mine in Andalusia that dates back at least as far as ancient Roman times. Eventually it all fell apart. The Andalusia regional government kicked them out and Canadian stock exchanges de-listed their shares. However, Petaquilla lives on in a plethora of criminal and civil cases in Panamanian courts and prosecutors’ offices and as a stack of unpaid bills.
Now its attorney and legal representative, 35-year-old José Gabriel Carrizo, will be the PRD candidate for vice president. Presidential standard bearer Laurentino “Nito” Cortizo chose him over the weekend, talking about Carrizo’s wonderful family and membership in the next generation of politicians. Pundits noted that Carrizo is from Penonomé, seat of a Cocle province where the PRD is usually weak and which Cortizo would surely like to win this time.
Fifer, dubbed “the father of modern mining in Panama” by a gushy industry publication, is out on bail and facing multiple criminal charges. He has a June 1 trial date for allegedly defrauding the Social Security Fund. Ricardo Martinelli remains in jail — but might soon be granted bail — and has a March trial date on warrantless eavesdropping and theft charges. The former president argues that on procedural and treaty grounds he can’t be tried for an insider trading and money laundering scheme in which worthless Petaquilla stock was hyped as something valuable and sold through a chain of intermediaries, with the proceeds hidden via another chain of intermediaries.
Perhaps the most important thing about the stock swindle and money laundering case is that it’s most probably also a murder case — government securities analyst Vernon Ramos disappeared in 2012 while investigating the case. There is no statute of limitations on such cases and in the event of a procedural bar to prosecution here, by treaty there remains the opportunity to ship the accused off to The Hague to be tried by the International Criminal Court.
By Electoral Tribunal records, Carrizo is one of Nito Cortizo’s main contributors, having delivered more than $90,000 to the PRD candidate’s primary campaign. Due to Electoral Tribunal practices, the record would not distinguish whether Carrizo was a fundraiser and bundler of other people’s donations or whether that was his own money. A 10-year member of the PRD, Carrizo has held no public office. His living has been made in the practice of law — of which being legal representative of Petaquilla was — and in his family’s real estate business. He is a graduate of the USMA law school.
The other VP hopefuls
Meanwhile Cambio Democratico presidential candidate Rómulo Roux has tapped former Telemetro reporter Luis Casís as his running mate. Casís comes from the tradition of journalists who deny having a point of view, is unaffiliated with any political party, has never held any public office and says that he has no politics.
The leftist Broad Front for Democracy — running to advance a cause rather that seriously contending for the presidency — has collectively chosen University of Panama economist Maribel Gordón as the running mate of its presidential candidate, labor leader Saúl Méndez. Gordón has been one of the principal thinkers behind the left wing of the Panamanian labor movement and its CONUSI labor federation. That the militant SUNTRACS construction workers’ union has consistently had a very good tactical sense of what the market will bear in its contract negotiations can in part be attributed to her.
The independents have already chosen their running mates — Ricardo Lambana recruiting former Electoral Tribunal magistrate Guillermo Márquez Amado, Ana Matilde Gómez running with former agriculture minister Jorge Arango, and Marco Ameglio having chosen former diplomat and legislator Mario Boyd Galindo. The Panameñista nominee, José Isabel Blandón, has yet to announce his choice.
Para una versión de mayor resolución de esta imagen, toque aquí. Estos son aviones de transporte C-17 de la Fuerza Aérea de los EEUU en Howard, una antigua base de la Fuerza Aérea del EEUU en Panamá que aún es un lugar de operaciones de avanzada del EEUU. Pero Howard también es ahora un centro de abastecimiento regional de ayuda humanitaria de varias agencias, que las fuerzas estadounidenses podrían usar en una situación de desastre. Podría presumirse que se trata de un movimiento militar dirigido a Venezuela, en cuyo caso destruiría aún más el principio de neutralidad panameña y tal vez haría de Panamá o su canal objeto de ataques.
Jailed former president Ricardo Martinelli is running for mayor and legislator from his prison lodgings in El Renacer near Gamboa, looking forward to a February 4 bail hearing and a March 12 trial for illegal eavesdropping, illegal use of government equipment to do that and ultimately the theft of that equipment.
(Full disclosure: as this reporter’s attorney and someone whose work is occasionally featured in The Panama News was on Martinelli’s known 150-member enemies list, email and telephone communication between that person and this reporter were intercepted.)
Before the trial was removed from the Supreme Court the prosecuting magistrate asked for a 23-year prison sentence and the magistrate acting as judged reduce the potential incarceration time to 21 years. Ricardo Martinelli may spend the rest of his life behind bars, or his remaining years out on bail and stuck in eternal litigation. As he fled the country to evade arrest, in any normal legal system bail would be out of the question but this is Panama.
Meanwhile the ex-president’s two sons, Ricardo Martinelli Linares and Luis Enrique Martinelli Linares, wait under house arrest in a Miami mansion for a March 4 immigration hearing, at which they may be deported for being in the United States without proper visas. That sort of deportation would avoid all manner of extradition issues, but the two young men might try to get voluntary departure to somewhere other than Panama so as to complicate and prolong matters.
On January 31 prosecutors from the anti-corruption and organized crime offices laid out their theories of two complicated cases involving the Martinellis. One, the Blue Apple affair, is about generalized corruption in public works contracting during the 2009-2014 Martinelli administration.
Anti-corruption prosecutor Aurelio Vásquez told of a more than $78 million kickback and money laundering scheme, involving a suppose factoring business called Blue Apple, 61 individuals, at least seven construction firms, at least 20 shell companies, the two younger Martinellis, a former minister of public works and the contracting director under him, a former vice president of Global Bank and an attorney who allegedly set up at least six money laundering chains.
Organized crime prosecutor David Mendoza described a scheme to divert nearly $44 million from a major road project and a big addition to the legislative palace, to finance the purchase by a group controlled by Ricardo Martinelli of EPASA, the parent company of the daily newspapers El Panama America and La Critica. The New Business case is named after one of 18 business entities, along with a law firm and four individuals, who funneled the stolen funds through 24 bank accounts at 13 banks situated in four countries. There may be more players to be discovered yet as prosecutors take their discovery missions to Switzerland, the United States and China, plus some Caribbean lands where some of the companies were registered.
The stakes are possible years in prison for the three Martinellis and their accomplices — powerful incentives for partners in crime to turn state’s evidence — and also the Martinelli media empire and its political effects. So far a number of people have made plea bargains but most of those named in both cases are denying all.
What to do in Panamanian legal culture? Why, argue procedure. The former president’s defenders are arguing the doctrine of specialty, which has it that a person extradited for one thing can’t be tried for another crime committed before the extradition without being first afforded an opportunity to return to the jurisdiction from whence he or she was extradited. It is specifically provided for in the 1904 US – Panamanian extradition treaty:
ARTICLE VIII.
No person surrendered by either of the high contracting parties to the other shall, without his consent, freely granted and publicly declared by him, be triable or tried or be punished for any crime or offense committed prior to his extradition, other than that for which he was delivered up, until he shall have had an opportunity of returning to the country from which he was surrendered.
However, as noted in a 93-page opinion by Magistrate Edwin Torres, the extradition was not based only on that treaty, but also on the Budapest Convention on Cyber Crimes and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Neither of those agreements contain a specialty clause. Nor did the US State Department specify that the extradition was only for the purpose of trial on one of the many cases pending against the older Martinelli.
With a Venezuelan opposition leader declaring himself the country’s president and the Trump administration appearing to back a coup, Venezuela is lurching toward a new phase of crisis. And that crisis could be worsened by hardline leadership at the Organization of American States (OAS), the world’s oldest and most influential regional organization.
Luis Almagro, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), recently announced his bid for another five-year term at the helm of the world’s oldest and most influential regional organization. His re-election would be a major setback for good governance in the region.
Throughout his tenure, Almagro has acted against many of the basic principles and mandates of the organization and consistently represented US interests, generally supporting allies and punishing adversaries of the US government. In particular, he has actively sought regime change in Venezuela. His often unsubstantiated claims against Venezuela and Cuba echo the rhetoric of dangerous terrorists like Luis Posada Carriles and his open intervention in internal politics has completely reversed diplomatic advances in resolving controversies, divided the continent and led his own party to expel him and advocate for removing him from the leadership of the OAS.
Abetting corruption and dictatorship
Moreover, as Almagro has set himself up as arbiter in the internal affairs of leftist nations (while turning a blind eye to blatant disregard for law in rightwing regimes), his own leadership faces serious corruption charges related to management of funds for the beleaguered anti-corruption mission in Honduras.
In an unusual move, Almagro appointed himself the head in absentia of the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras (MACCIH), maintaining control of the mission and finances in Washington. The MACCIH was founded in 2015 as a result of citizen pressure and placed under the auspices of the OAS.
The lead representative of the MACCIH, former Peruvian prime minister Juan Jiménez Mayor resigned in frustration in February 2018, citing lack of support from Almagro, withdrawal of security measures for his team, and a “pact of impunity” between Almagro and JOH.
Jiménez also publicly accused Almagro of hiring persons close to him at hefty salaries despite the fact that the commission in Honduras doesn’t know what it is they do. With signs of corruption within the OAS anti-corruption mission, MACCIH lawyers requested an audit by the OEA Inspector General. Although member countries seconded the request, no audit was carried out.
Tensions between Almagro and the anti-corruption commission had been building for months. The MACCIH had recently taken on some major investigations in the midst of a political crisis in the country. Since the 2009 coup d’etat, Honduras has lurched from one crisis to the next. The nation has suffered a series of corruption scandals under the post-coup regimes, rule of law has deteriorated, and state and criminal violence have soared, often hand in hand.
On November 26, 2017 President Juan Orlando Hernández was re-elected in elections viewed as illegitimate by the majority of the population and many experts. Although the OAS declared the elections essentially too dirty to call, the opposition criticized the OAS for tacitly supporting the US Embassy in propping up Hernández (JOH), as massive protests called for him to step down and government forces killed at least 16 protesters.
In early 2018, with continuing post-electoral conflict, the MACCIH uncovered a corruption scheme involving members of the Honduran congress. The case alleges that legislators syphoned off hundreds of thousands of dollars in public money (in a country where 25% of the population lives on $5.50 a day or less). The MACCIH has filed several similar cases against government corruption since then, the latest on December 11. As the mission attacked corruption, it began to receive threats and encounter what one member, the Peruvian prosecutor Julio Arbizu, called “serious obstacles” to its work directly from Almagro.
A June 2018 evaluation of the MACCIH by experts at American University concurs that much of the blame for the obstacles and failures of the MACCIH can be directly attributed to Almagro. The study concludes: “The political course of the MACCIH has revealed an OAS weakened and divided, directed by an impulsive and inconsistent Secretary General.” The report quotes a member of the anti-corruption commission saying that Almagro “spent more time spying on our colleagues to report to Washington what Jiménez Mayor was up to than working on what we were supposed to be doing.”
Almagro’s decisions to abandon the Honduran political crisis and back off on prosecuting corruption and state crimes, undermining his own mission, has contributed to the exodus of thousands of Hondurans seeking refuge in the United States. Since the audit of his office requested by MACCIH members and donor countries was blocked, allegations against Almagro of misuse of funds have not been cleared up.
Dividing the Hemisphere
Almagro’s support for the Honduran leader deemed a dictator by his own people contrasts sharply with his extremely aggressive campaign against Venezuela. In a shocking break for with his diplomatic mandate, on September 14 Almagro threatened military intervention to overthrow the Maduro government. This position violates the OAS Charter and the reason for being of the organization, articulated in Article 21 that states “the territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever;” Article 3 that mandates “respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of States;” and numerous commitments to resolve conflicts through diplomacy and peaceful means.
Almagro’s statement, although not unexpected, provoked an avalanche of criticisms from diplomats. His own party, the Broad Front of Uruguay, voted unanimously to expel him and the Uruguayan government announced it will oppose his re-election.
The promotion of intervention in alliance with the Trump administration has carefully driven a wedge between nations and forces in the hemisphere. Almagro’s attempts at regime change in Venezuela were consistently seconded by the Mexican and Colombian governments, but the new government of Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador wisely decided against continuing to play the role of Almagro-Trump lackey in the OAS and abstained from a declaration by the majority of the Lima Group not to recognize Maduro’s re-election. Although Almagro has found a new ally in the neofascist government of Jair Bolsonaro, that alliance will only make the politicized nature of his strategy more painfully obvious.
The OAS chief’s obsession with Venezuela has eroded his leadership and distracted the organization from confronting shared threats to the region. The cozy relationship to the Trump administration has meant downplaying the need to promote joint measures to slow climate change. Nor has the organization under Almagro’s rule taken a strong stance in defense of migrant rights despite thousands of deaths and human rights violations.
With the United States withdrawing from international accords on climate change, migration and other shared interests — and Brazil following suit — there’s a growing governance gap on the most pressing issues facing the hemisphere. The OAS must step up to fill that gap, with creative solutions for working together before inequality and indifference send the planet into a tailspin.
Almagro has been far more interested in anti-democratic regime change than in facing these critical challenges. The region has an opportunity to restore regional cooperation on shared priorities. But that will require a change in leadership.
Was it the people who complained that their names appeared on Marco Ameglio’s nominating petitions, but that they didn’t sign and would not have signed? Not that, although at least 46 people, not including candidates, have been referred to the Electoral Prosecutor over bogus signatures.
Electoral Prosecutor Eduardo Peñaloza, a Ricardo Martinelli appointee who notoriously looked the other way in the tainted 2014 campaign and then argued for dismissal of all charges when the Electoral Tribunal’s own investigations led to cases being opened, finally found a case to file. Under this year’s regulations, those seeking spots on the ballot as independent presidential candidates were limited to spending no more than $2 per signature in their petition campaigns. Marco Ameglio filed an expense report of $259,763.84, all of which came from his own pocket. He submitted 355,038 signatures, of which the Electoral Tribunal accepted only 115,071 as legitimate.
Look for possible litigation about how to count and do long division, but not about the apparently massive petition fraud by Ameglio and Francisco Carreira. The latter, who came in fifth in the race for three ballot spots, submitted 245,399 signatures. The tribunal only found 70,643 of these to be valid.
Carreira admits that lists of Electoral Tribunal data (which are supposed to be confidential) were used in his petition drive. But in 2014 the use of such government data by the Martinelli campaign was disregarded by Peñaloza and the matter never got to the Electoral Tribunal or to the regular criminal justice system.
Ameglio, a former legislator and at one time president of the Panameñista Party, denies all wrongdoing and says that he will put up a vigorous legal defense.
If Ameglio gets bumped off of the ballot, the next in line would be Dimitri Flores. That is, presuming that he doesn’t have the same problem as Ameglio or if he does will get different treatment.